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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the interactions between fundamental principles of domestic legal systems 
and non-legal standards in the application of the public policy Generalklausel within the context of the twin 
Regulations 1103 and 1104 of 2016. In particular, this paper argues that public policy is composed of legal 
principles only and that there is no space for extra legal standards when the circulation of foreign deeds, 
decisions and laws is in discussion. This consideration has two consequences. Firstly, the role of good morals 
within contemporary private international law is extremely reduced. Secondly, there is no space for the direct 
application of soft-law standards when public policy is at stake.
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RESUMEN: En este trabajo se analizan las interacciones entre los principios fundamentales de los sistemas jurídicos 
nacionales y las normas no jurídicas en la aplicación del orden público Generalklausel en el contexto de los Reglamentos 
2016/1103 y 2016/1104. En particular, este trabajo sostiene que el orden público se compone únicamente de principios 
jurídicos y que no hay espacio para normas extrajurídicas cuando se discute la circulación de escrituras, decisiones y leyes 
extranjeras. Esta consideración tiene dos consecuencias. En primer lugar, el papel de las buenas costumbres dentro del 
Derecho internacional privado contemporáneo es extremadamente reducido. En segundo lugar, no hay espacio para la 
aplicación directa de normas de soft-law cuando está en juego el orden público.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Derecho; Moral; Orden público; Generalklauseln; Anulación de las reglas obligatorias; Buena fe; 
Soft Law.
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I. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY WITHIN THE TWIN REGULATIONS 1103 
AND 1104 OF 2016 AND THE ISSUE CONCERNING TH APPLICABILITY OF 
NON LEGAL STANDARDS AS PART OF THIS GENERALKLAUSEL.
The twins EU Regulations 1103 and 1104 of 24 June 2016 (in force since 29 
January 2019) – implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, 
applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
(i) matrimonial property regimes and (ii) registered partnerships (respectively) 
– constitute an important step within the process of uniformization of family 
law matters in the context of the European Union’s private international law1. 
However, this process shall necessarily take its time because, in order to ensure 
that the harmony between EU legal system in family matters is gradually reached 
without sacrificing the domestic identities2, it is first of all necessary to wait for more 
cultural homogeneity in family matters between EU Member States. Uniformity is 
important, but not at all costs; and, as we will see, Regulations 1103 and 1104 of 
20163 seem to be a good point of balance in the tension between uniformity and 
protection of domestic traditions.
The EU legislator, in light of the socially and culturally fragmented scenario 
concerning family law, has never had the intention of providing a complete 
1 This is the necessary completion of the trend started with the already mentioned Regulation 2201 of 
2003, as well as Regulations 4 of 2009 (on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations), 1259 of 2010 (so called “Rome 
III Regulation”, implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation) and 650 of 2012 (on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a 
European	Certificate	of	Succession).
2 On this subject, see, more generally PerlinGieri, P.: “Il rispetto dell’identità nazionale nel sistema italo 
europeo”, Foro. Nap., 2014, p. 449 ff.
3	 Please	 note	 that,	 unless	 in	 the	 exceptional	 cases	 where	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	
Regulations,	we	will	only	refer	to	the	provisions	of	Regulation	1103	(which	find	also	equal	place,	mutatis 
mutandis, in regulation 1104).
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primary law system for EU family law. Instead, it is trying to achieve the objective 
of harmonization in Europe through private international law (i.e. providing for 
uniform criteria for jurisdiction, applicable law and circulation of judgments). 
Should the circumstances allow to do so, and only in a second moment, the EU 
legislator will perhaps try to issue an embryonic form of EU primary legislation in 
matters of family4.
Among the rationales inspiring the twins Regulations 1103 and 11045, uniformity 
and legal certainty surely play essential roles.
Uniformity is expressed, first of all, by the ideas of universal application and 
unity of applicable law6, which respectively set forth that (i) “the law designated 
as applicable by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a 
Member State” (art. 20); and (ii) “[t]he law applicable to a matrimonial property 
regime pursuant to Article 22 or 26 shall apply to all assets falling under that 
regime, regardless of where the assets are located” (Art. 21, which applies save as 
for the application of the lex rei sitae to real estates). Secondly, uniformity is ensured 
by the autonomous definition7 that the EU legislator has given of “matrimonial 
property regime”8, which, according to article 3 of the Regulation 1103, means 
“a set of rules concerning the property relationships between the spouses and 
in their relations with third parties, as a result of marriage or its dissolution”9. 
Uniformity, however, as already stressed above, should not be pursued at any 
cost. The Regulations do not even try to offer a single definition of the concepts of 
marriage (which continue to be defined and regulated, sometimes very differently, 
4 riCCi, C.: Giurisdizione in materia di regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi nello spazio giudiziario europeo, Padova, 2020, 
p. 32.
5 For a general analysis concerning the Regulations see damasCelli, D.: “Applicable law, jurisdiction, and 
recognition of decisions in matters relating to property regimes of spouses and partners in European and 
Italian private international law”, Trusts, 2018, p. 1 ff.
6 See viarenGo, I.: “Effetti patrimoniali delle unioni civili transfrontaliere: la nuova disciplina europea”, Riv. dir. 
int. priv. e proc., 2018, p. 44 ff.
7 This is a general tendency of EU law. See las Casas, A.: “La nozione autonoma di «regime patrimoniale tra 
coniug» del regolamento UE 2016/1103 e i modelli nazionali”, Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, 2019, p. 1538 
ff. According to CJEU, judgment of 6 October 1982, Case C-283/81, Srl CILFIT e Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. 
Ministero della Sanità, para. 19, Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, it 
must be emphasized that legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in Community law and 
in the law of the various Member States. Therefore (para. 20) “every provision of Community law must 
be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in 
question is to be applied”. 
8 Or, in Regulation 1104, of “property consequences of registered partnerships”.
9 Similarly, art. 3 of Regulation 1104 states that “‘property consequences of a registered partnership’ means 
the set of rules concerning the property relationships of the partners, between themselves and in their 
relations with third parties, as a result of the legal relationship created by the registration of the partnership 
or	its	dissolution”.	This	definition	derived	from	the	decision	of	the	CJEU,	27	March	1979,	Jacques de Cavel v. 
Louise de Cavel, Case C-143/78, para. 7. In this regard, las Casas, a.: “La nozione autonoma”, cit., p. 1540, 
correctly noted that the notion of “patrimonial regime” is extended to the regulation also to relationships 
with third parties, thus creating a notion which is broader than its usual meaning. 
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by domestic systems of law)10 and give adequate relevance to imperative norms of 
domestic systems, either expressed by principles (public policy) or more specific 
rules (overriding mandatory rules).
Strictly related is the need for legal certainty, which inspires the entire EU 
system of private international law: a party should be able to know in advance 
where it may start legal proceedings, which law will be applied and under what 
conditions a judgment may be recognized. In matters of applicable law, this is 
clearly expressed by Recital 43 of the Regulations, according to which “[i]n order 
to allow citizens to avail themselves, with all legal certainty, of the benefits offered 
by the internal market, this Regulation should enable spouses to know in advance 
which law will apply to their matrimonial property regime. Harmonised conflict-of-
law rules should therefore be introduced in order to avoid contradictory results”. 
With regard to the enforcement of foreign judgments concerning matrimonial 
relationships, legal certainty requires that, in general, these judgments are enforced 
throughout the legal systems participating to the enhanced cooperation and, in 
predetermined exceptional cases, such a circulation of judgments may be limited.
Relatedly, Member States which have taken part in this enhanced cooperation 
have been inspired by a favor for the circulation of judgments which enforce 
patrimonial regimes arising from marriages or registered partnerships11. In this 
regard, it is significant that the Regulations contain a rule, namely art. 9, which has 
been enacted with the precise purpose of avoiding the circulation of decisions 
denying the recognition of patrimonial regimes arising from marriages or registered 
partnership. Indeed, according to this rule, if a court of the Member State that has 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Regulations “holds that, under its private international 
law, the marriage in question is not recognised for the purposes of matrimonial 
property regime proceedings, it may decline jurisdiction”. This provision clearly 
expresses the idea that is better to decline jurisdiction than to have a judgment 
against the recognition of patrimonial relationships between spouses or members 
10 Similarly, Art. 3 of Regulation 1104, concerning registered partnerships, states that “‘registered partnership’ 
means the regime governing the shared life of two people which is provided for in law, the registration 
of	which	 is	mandatory	under	that	 law	and	which	 fulfils	 the	 legal	 formalities	required	by	that	 law	 for	 its	
creation”.	At	closer	look,	this	is	not	a	substantive	definition	of	registered	partnership	and	the	provision	
merely	identify	the	formal	requirement	of	registration.	On	the	coordination	of	this	definition	with	the	one	
provided by the Italian law n. 76 of 2016 (so-called “Cirinnà law”) see riCCi, C.: Giurisdizione, cit., p. 72 ff.
11 This favor is expressed by the limited number of causes which may justify non-recognition according to the 
Regulations. Indeed, according to article 37, “[a] decision shall not be recognised: (a) if such recognition 
is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State in which recognition is sought; 
(b) where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which 
instituted	the	proceedings	or	with	an	equivalent	document	in	sufficient	time	and	in	such	a	way	as	to	enable	
him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the 
decision when it was possible for him to do so; (c) if it is irreconcilable with a decision given in proceedings 
between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought; (d) if it is irreconcilable with 
an earlier decision given in another Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action 
and	between	the	same	parties,	provided	that	the	earlier	decision	fulfils	the	conditions	necessary	for	 its	
recognition in the Member State in which recognition is sought”.
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of a registered partnership, considering that, as a matter of principle, that judgment 
should circulate throughout Europe.
In light of these guiding principles – moving between European uniformity 
and the safeguard of domestic fundamental principles – it will be possible to 
understand why the Regulations give also relevance to domestic imperative norms 
in the private international law system concerning patrimonial regimes in the EU 
even if, as all EU private international law regulations, they try to limitate at most 
the recourse to these “safety valves”. In this regard, Article 31 (titled “Public policy 
[ordre public]”) provides that “[t]he application of a provision of the law of any State 
specified by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum”, while article 30 
(titled “Overriding mandatory provisions”) states that “1. Nothing in this Regulation 
shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of 
the forum”. The reference respectively applies to those fundamental principles and 
rules which are considered so important as to require their application without 
exception also to transnational cases. 
The two provisions find some clarification in Recitals 53 and 54, which affirm 
that both public policy and mandatory rules shall be applied in “exceptional 
circumstances” and on the basis of “considerations of public interest”. In this regard, 
while it is today acknowledged that public policy is a Generalklausel composed 
by the fundamental principles of a State which are considered so essential as to 
require application in all cases (including those with a foreign element)12 where 
the concrete application of foreign law generates a result which is incompatible 
with such principles, overriding mandatory rules (“lois de police” or “norme di 
applicazione necessaria”)13 are those domestic rules which claim to be applied in 
any case and regardless of the functioning of private international law rules14.
Considerations of public interest are central in the definition of public 
policy contained in Regulations 1103 and 1104. These considerations allow the 
application of national fundamental principles of the forum to a case concerning 
the transnational regulation of patrimonial regimes between couples and could 
lead to the non-application of foreign law and to the non-recognition of foreign 
judgments (in accordance with article 37). This is an essential safeguard which, 
again, mediates between the needs to allow the international circulation of values 
12 This is the reason why we usually talk about “international public policy”. See PerlinGieri, G. and zarra, G.: 
Ordine pubblico interno e internazionale tra caso concreto e sistema ordinamentale, Napoli, 2019, p. 48 ff.
13 Bonomi, A.: “Le norme di applicazione necessaria nel regolamento «Roma I»”, in BosChiero, n. (ed.).: La 
nuova disciplina comunitaria della legge applicabile ai contratti (Roma I), Torino, 2009, pp. 173-189.
14 See, inter alia, FranCesCakis, P.: “Quelques précisions sur les lois d’application immédiate et leurs rapports 
avec	les	règles	de	conflits	de	lois”,	Revue critique de droit international privé, 1966, pp. 1-18.
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and that of safeguarding national identities. However, as the case law reveals, it is 
not easy to understand what menaning to give to the concept of public interest. 
In Renusagar Power Co Ltd v. General Electric Co15 a distinguished arbitral Tribunal 
noted that [p]ublic policy connotes some matter which concerns the public good 
and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public 
interest or what is injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has 
varied from time to time.
As to the ascertainment of which considerations of public interest may 
justify the recourse to public policy, the Regulations offer to us limited guidance. 
However, article 38 of the Regulations, titled “Fundamental Rights”, provides that 
“[a]rticle 37 of this Regulation [providing for the grounds for non recognition of 
foreign judgments] shall be applied by the courts and other competent authorities 
of the Member States in observance of the fundamental rights and principles 
recognised in the Charter, in particular in Article 21 thereof on the principle of 
non-discrimination”. This is a significant provision from two perspectives. First of 
all, it clarifies – even if it was pleonastic – that the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights constitutes an example of EU public policy, i.e. the general principles which 
represent the real core of the legal system of the EU and that shall be applied by 
domestic judges jointly with the international public policy of their countries16. 
Secondly, the provision officially recognizes the relevance of human rights within 
the context of private international law17, and, from this angle, this can both mean 
that a foreign decision violating fundamental human rights (protected by domestic 
and EU law) shall not be recognized and that the respect for human rights may 
dictate the recognition of a certain decision in a specific case. However, no other 
clarifications to the concept of public interest are offered by the Regulations. 
Given these premises, this article will try to understand a crucial issue 
concerning the application of public policy (and the concept of public interest), i.e. 
whether this Generalklausel may be filled in with the relevant legal principles only, 
or also with moral considerations, as the reading of many definition of the concept 
seems to assume. This is a primary question when dealing with matters concerning 
family law, considering that this area of the law, more than others, is affected by the 
cultural differences in the various national legal orders. Indeed, decisions rapplying 
public policy in private international law, mainly coming from the common law 
world, very often relate this concept to non-legal values. Indeed, according to the 
Supreme Court of Texas, Texas Courts will not enforce a foreign law that violates 
15 [1995] XX Yearbook on Commercial Arbitration 681, para. 24.
16 See FeraCi, O.: L’ordine pubblico nel diritto dell’Unione europea, Milano, 2012, passim.
17 See, ex multis, kinsCh, P.: “Droits de l’homme, droit fondamentaux et droit international privé”, Recueil des 
cours, vol. 195, p. 1 ff.
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good morals, natural justice or is prejudicial to the general interests of our own 
citizens18.
Even more confusingly, in Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH 
v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Company19 the High Court of London stated 
that in order to evaluate a foreign decision as violating peremptory norms of 
the lex fori [i]t has to be shown that there is some element of illegality or that 
the enforcement of the award would be clearly injurious to the public good or, 
possibly, that enforcement would be wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable 
and fully informed member of the public on whose behalf the powers of the state 
are exercised. 
These definitions do not help in understanding whether “the public interest” 
has to be identified with the general principles of the legal system or with some 
other non-legal parameters, identified in murky concepts such as “good morals” 
and “natural justice”20. In the following lines, we will try to argue in favour of the 
former interpretation.
II. THE ROLE OF MORALS IN THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY.
This Section is aimed at understanding the role of morals in the application of 
public policy by domestic judges. In this regard, it is to be noted that very often, in 
the evaluation of what composes the public policy Generalklausel, interpreters may 
risk making application of their own conception of morality21.
Moral “lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, 
or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must 
fail of its mark”22. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that by referring to 
“morals” in this context we also mean social, political and religious considerations 
which may affect the application of the law. It is quite obvious to assume that all 
the legal principles and rules that are perceived so important as to be considered 
“imperative” have – to a different extent – a moral foundation. What has to be 
18 Gutierrez v. Collins [1979] 583 SW 2d 312, 321.
19 [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 246, 254.
20 Similarly, another US Court discussed of public policy as the sum of the “forum state’s most basic notions 
of morality and justice”, without even referring to the fundamental principles of the legal system. See US 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co. Inc v. Société Générale de l’Industrie du 
Papier RAKTA and Bank of America [1974], 508 F. 2d 969.
21 See also Corthaut, t.: EU Ordre Public, Aalpen aan den Rijn, 2012, p. 21.
22 This conception of morality, which focuses on the realization of the common good, is named by Fuller, 
l.: The Morality of Law (Revised Edition), London, 1969, pp. 5-6, as “the morality of duty” and it is the 
conception of morality to which we will refer for the purpose of this book, because it is aimed at ensuring 
the correct regulation of private relationships within an ordered society. 
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clarified is whether, when and how the application of peremptory principles or 
rules allows an adjudicator to make reference to her/his idea of what is moral23.
As imaginable, solutions might be different depending on the kind of legal 
system under examination. Civil law systems are based on rigid constitutions that 
are assumed to enshrine the basic axiological, moral foundations upon which the 
legal system is grounded. As a matter of principle, therefore, there should be no 
place for moral evaluations in the application of the law24. Contrariwise, common 
law systems (both having a written constitution, like the US, and not, as the UK) 
are traditionally based on judge-made law, which, by definition, involves a greater 
level of discretion by adjudicators and, therefore, allows them to make reference 
to basic notions of morality and justice. 
More in detail, as to civil law systems, it is worth noting that the legal relevance 
of any fact of life is related to ethical and social evaluations, but is grounded on an 
ad hoc criterion of evaluation, i.e. the founding principles of the legal system, which 
represent, among the values which inspire the society, those which have been 
considered by decision-makers so important as to require, through legalization, the 
guarantee of their realization25 (emphasis added).
As a consequence, it is possible to say that morality is duly taken into account 
when a society agrees upon the values that have to inspire the legal principles at 
the basis of its legal system. Afterwards, it will be for these legal principles to guide 
adjudicators in their decisions. Fundamental principles of the legal system generate 
a so-called “positive morality” or “Rechtsmoral”26, which shall drive judges in their 
work. Hence, we are excluding that morals as such drive adjudicators’ work, but 
we are accepting that positivized morals affect the decision-making process. The 
idea according to which the identification of the founding principles of a state (and 
the choice of the moral conceptions to employ in the law) can find confirmation 
also in the use of the word “policy” instead of “order” in the current English (and 
mainly US) understanding of the concept of ordre public. The use of the word 
“policy” impliedly tells us that fundamental principles aimed at filling in the empty 
box of ordre public are a matter of political choices to be carried out by legislators. 
23 Subjective/personal conceptions of morality are, according to Fuller, L.: The Morality, cit., p. 5 f., part of 
“the morality of aspiration”, which is the one which dictates behaviors which tend to inspire people to 
the reach excellence and to get the full realization of their capacities. Obviously, the morality of aspiration 
varies in accordance with the beliefs of each person. It is not relevant, as we will see, in the application of 
the law.
24 viola, F.: “La teoria della separazione tra diritto e morale”, in AA.VV.: Studi in memoria di Giovanni 
Tarello, Giuffrè, Milano, 1990, p 673 ff.; BarBeris, m.: “Diritto e morale: la discussione odierna”, Journal for 
Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law, 2011, p. 56 f.
25 Falzea, a.: “Complessità giuridica”, in sirena, P. (ed.): Oltre il “positivismo giuridico” in onore di Angelo Falzea, 
Napoli, 2011, p. 5 (own translation). 
26 Pastore, B.: “Dworkin giusnaturalista?”, Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 1984, p. 80; PerlinGieri, G.: 
“La via alternativa alle teorie del «diritto naturale» e del «positivismo giuridico inclusivo» ed «esclusivo». 
Leggendo Wil J. Waluchow”, Annali SISDIC, 2020, p. 73 ff.
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Hence, in the identification of imperative norms (including principles composing 
public policy), judges shall always refer to those choices (as expressed by the legal 
system). 
As Gerald Goldstein puts it [l]’emploi du mot policy, et non order, implique 
bien cette idée de considération de politique gouvernementale, qui se retrouvera 
au cœur des conceptions américaines modernes. Ceci explique la [moderne] 
tendance très nette des juges anglais de restreindre leur usage de la notion en 
invoquant la séparation des pouvoirs; c’est le législateur, en principe, et non le 
juge, qui a le pouvoir de déterminer les grandes orientations politiques et ce qui 
constitue leur violation27 (emphasis in original).
From this angle, the norms expressing the fundamental values and moral 
foundations upon which a state is grounded are to be considered as imperative28. 
In the words of an authoritative scholar: [l]egal systems are inspired by a certain 
philosophy, which lets us evaluate certain behaviours as permissible or impermissible 
on the basis of cultural values inherent to the legal system, and which inspires the 
understanding of the technical choices made by legislators29 (emphasis added).
We know that the way in which legal principles are to be applied depends on 
the circumstances of the concrete case30: judges make, in all their decisions, an 
evaluation of which value (encapsulated in a legal principle or rule) has to prevail, 
by way of balancing the interests and values which may be potentially applied to 
the dispute31. This generates a circular process in which the sensibility of judges 
comes significantly into play as a decisive factor in unravelling the complexity of 
concrete cases through the process of balancing. Hence, morals come before the 
law, but also exercise a certain influence when the law has to be interpreted 
and applied32. Imperative principles composing public policy, whose application 
depends on interpretation, are not extraneous to this process.
27 Goldstein, G.: De l’exception d’ordre public aux règles d’application necessaire, Montreal, 1996, p. 153.
28 This, however, implies that decision-makers can expressly provide – within the law – that certain decisions 
are to be based on (or related to) moral evaluations. The reference applies, e.g., to the rare cases in which 
the law refers to “good morals”, a concept which seems to imply (infra Section 2.3) social, ethical and moral 
evaluations by judges. BianCa,	C.M.:	“Riflessioni	di	un	civilista	sul	diritto	naturale”,	in	sirena, P. (ed.): Oltre 
il “positivismo giuridico” in onore di Angelo Falzea, cit., p. 40.
29 PerlinGieri, P.: “La «grande dicotomia» diritto positivo - diritto naturale, in Oltre il «positivismo giuridico»”, 
in sirena, P. (ed.): Oltre il “positivismo giuridico” in onore di Angelo Falzea, cit., p. 91 (own translation). See also 
BianCa,	C.M.:	“Riflessioni	di	un	civilista”,	cit.,	p.	42	and	CrisCuolo, F.: “Constitutional Axiology and Party 
Autonomy”, The Italian Law Journal,	2017,	p.	372,	affirming	that	“within	a	democratic	State	governed	by	the	
rule of law, featuring a hierarchy of sources with a rigid Constitution at its top, it may never be stated that 
there is no shared essential project of justice as an expression of constituent values and not merely of 
moral imperatives”.
30 sCaCCia, G.: “Constitutional Values and Judge-Made Law”, The Italian Law Journal, 2017, p. 178.
31 This is called as “reasonableness-style” legal reasoning and is probably the most applied style of legal 
reasoning today. See, in general terms, PerlinGieri, G.: Profili applicativi della ragionevolezza nel diritto civile, 
Napoli, 2015, passim. 
32 Pino, G.: “Diritto e morale”, in BonGiovanni, G. (ed.): Che cos’è il diritto. Ontologia e concezioni del giuridico, 
Torino, 2016, p. 18.
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The situation is not very different in common law, but, as to these systems 
of law, it is necessary to account for a longer tradition in which law and morals 
have been significantly intertwined. Indeed, with reference to the common law 
as developed in the UK, adjudicators’ decisions were pervaded by their idea of 
morality, possibly the one which best represented the societal sentiment33. Indeed, 
as it has been authoritatively said, [t]he judge, according to the classical common 
law conception, expresses the essence of the community’s moral experience, 
distilling it in the form of ‘wise’ decisions. (…) The wise decision would be the one 
that would satisfy the popular sense of justice of the community, and would be 
capable of being understood as rational, principled and constituent in the light of 
prior decisions and predictable future cases34. 
In light of the above, it can be said that in common law the adjudicators’ task 
was that of creating legal principles out of diverse social and moral experiences35. 
Imperative norms were therefore directly grounded on the judges’ conception of 
morality.
The situation has, however, evolved. Common law systems today have started 
developing the practice of enacting statutes, at least in certain crucial areas 
of the law. As a consequence, judicial activity has today become closer to the 
one of civil law judges, mainly consisting in statutory interpretation36. Moreover, 
the crystallization of precedents has generated – notwithstanding the obvious 
possibility of overrulings37 – a corpus of principles and rules applicable to certain 
categories of cases that might be compared to written laws. Hence, like in civil law 
systems, positive law (either enacted by legislators or created through precedents) 
provides the “rules of the game” which establish the ways in which morality can 
enter into the law38. 
Indeed, as stated by the Supreme Court of Michigan, [p]ublic policy of a State 
is fixed by its Constitution, its statutory law, and decisions of its courts, and when 




34 Cotterell, R.: “Common Law Approaches to the Relationship between Law and Morality”, Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice,	2000,	p.	11.	The	strict	link	between	law	and	morals	also	finds	confirmation	in	an	analysis	
of the role of juries, which had the obligation to issue “a verdict according to conscience”. 
35 Cotterell, R.: “Common Law”, cit., p. 13.
36 Cotterell, R.: “Common Law”, cit., p. 14.
37 PalomBino, F.M.: Fair and Equitable Treatment and the Fabric of General Principles, The Hague – Heidelberg 
2018, p. 144 ff.
38 BoBBio, N.: The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game, Minneapolis, 1987, p. 156. According 
to Cotterell, R.: “Common Law”, cit., p. 18, it is necessary to recognize that “law cannot realistically be 
regarded	today	as	relating	to	a	single	morally	unified	community.	Rather,	 it	relates	to	different	kinds	of	
moral	community	reflecting	different	types	of	social	relationship	that	bind	people	together”.
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the Legislature enacts a law (…) enactment is so far as it bears upon matter of 
public policy is conclusive (…). Public policy is but the manifest will of the State39.
Then, the diverse values at stake in every case (expressed through fundamental 
principles of law) are to be balanced by adjudicators on the basis of an analysis of the 
circumstances of concrete cases and taking into account all the relevant competing 
principles and interests40. Therefore, in common law too, imperativeness is today 
grounded in positive law. However, it does not mean that morality does not play 
any role anymore: as in civil law tradition, to the extent that it is meant as positive 
morality, it does play a crucial role, when judges have to interpret the law and to 
balance imperative principles and rules41.
III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PUBIC POLICY AND GOOD MORALS.
From the above, it might be easier to infer how ordre public interacts with 
good morals (the French bonnes moeurs, and Italian buon costume), i.e. the societal 
conception of decency. This is, for the inextricable links existing between the law 
and non-legal traditions affecting this area of the law, another extremely important 
issue with regard to the functioning of public policy in family law matters.
According to Domat (whose thinking was based on Papinianus’ writings)42, 
when something is against good morals “it is a harm to human virtues, it offends 
people’s honor and decency”43. Historically, this is not a concept of strictum ius, 
but rather recalls some ethical, religious and somehow subjective evaluations of 
decency44. Good morals, according to the traditional view, seem to introduce a 
39 Michigan Supreme Court, Lieberthal v. Glens Fall Indemnity [1946], 316 Mich 37; 24 NW 2d 547.
40 Currie,	B.:	“Married	Women’s	Contracts:	A	Study	in	Conflict-of-Laws	Method”,	University of Chicago Law 
Review, 1958, passim. See also Pound, R.: “Law and Morals – Jurisprudence and Ethics”, North Carolina Law 
Review, 1945, p. 188.
41 It is, therefore, possible to try to arrange some general conclusions concerning the ways in which values 
penetrate	 in	 adjudicators’	 legal	 reasoning	 and	 influence	 the	 determination	 of	which	 norms	 have	 to	 be	
considered as imperative. Following the approach of the distinguished US scholar Michael S. Moore, it 
is arguable that morality enters into judges’ reasoning in four ways: (i) when the latter expressly refers 
to the former as a parameter for evaluating conducts (e.g. when the law refers to “good morals”, “moral 
turpitude” etc.); (ii) as a matter of argumentation, judges may make recourse (also) to values in order to 
justify the (legal) solution they reach; (iii) in interpreting the law adjudicators duly take into account the 
values which are at the basis of the legal system; and (iv) in the cases where the application of the obvious 
law conducts to wrong, unjust or otherwise immoral results, judges may make recourse to the morality 
emerging from fundamental principles of the system in order to avoid to reach such results. In this regard, it 
is important to clarify that, while sub (i) the reference applies to the moral conception of the judge of what 
is right or wrong, sub (ii), (iii) and (iv) we always refer to the one we have called the “positive morality”, i.e. 
the morality which is encapsulated in the rules and principles that are going to be applied. See moore, M.S.: 
“Four	Reflections	on	Law	and	Morality”,	William and Mary Law Review, 2007, p. 1527 ff.
42 Digesto 28, 7, 15. More generally, contracts with immoral consideration (negotia ob turpem causam) were 
forbidden in Roman law. See GiGliotti, F.: Prestazione contraria al buon costume, Milano, 2015, p. 13 ff.
43 domat, J.: Le leggi civili disposte nel loro naturale ordine, VIII, Pavia (translation of the French edition of 1776) 
1831, p. 348.
44 traBuCChi, A.: “Buon costume”, in Enciclopedia del diritto (online), Milano, 1959, p. 1; Carresi, F.: “Il negozio 
illecito per contrarietà al buon costume”, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, 1949, p. 34.
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form of imperativeness deriving from societal conscience45 to be added to the 
imperativeness deriving from the law, which is encapsulated in the two notions of 
public policy and mandatory rules. If one accepts this approach (something which 
will be denied), when good morals are rendered applicable by the law, adjudicators 
would face to parameters of imperativeness to be applied in parallel: the legal one 
(public policy) and the one deriving from her/his conception of decency (good 
morals).
The analysis of the interaction between public policy and good morals is not 
a proof of concept, but an actual necessity dictated by the fact that traditionally 
the two categories have been referred to by domestic systems of law, in order 
to determine the nullity of domestic contracts and/or the impossibility to apply 
foreign law. In civil law countries, the law provides that contracts may be null and 
void either for violations of public policy or for contrariness to good morals (the 
two grounds are seen separately)46. Contrariwise, in common law systems the two 
notions of ordre public and good morals are usually jointly referred to by judges as 
parts of the broader public policy review47. 
In the words of Cardozo Justice, [t]he courts are not free to enforce a foreign 
right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency and 
fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would violate some fundamental 
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common weal48.
Until the first half of the twentieth century, written laws very often made 
reference to common conceptions of morals (“public morals”), in order to allow 
or forbid certain behaviors to private parties. The reference to good morals (or 
bonnes moeurs) was also often made to provide judges with a tool to fill in the 
lacunae of the legal order49. The reason for this continuous reference to bonos 
45 Ferrara, F.: Teoria del negozio illecito nel diritto civile italiano, Milano, 1914, p. 6; Crea, C.: “La ‘resilienza’ del 
buon costume: l’itinerario francese e italiano, tra fraternité e diversité”, Rassegna di diritto civile, 2019, p. 887.
46	 It	is	here	sufficient	to	mention,	with	regard	to	domestic	relationships,	Article	1133	of	the	Code Napoleon of 
1804 (in force until 2016), as well as articles 1343 and 1418 of the Italian Civil Code, saying that a contract 
is null and void whenever the consideration is illegal, i.e. it is contrary to mandatory rules, ordre public, or 
good morals. It is worth noting that in Germany the situation is different, considering that § 138 of the BGB 
attributes to good morals (gute Sitten) the functions that are traditionally proper of public policy. As to 
private international law relationships, Article 31 of the Italian Preliminary Norms to the Italian Civil Code 
(in force until 1995) stated that the application of foreign law was to be forbidden when in violation of ordre 
public and bonnes moeurs.
47 Forde, P.B.: “The «Ordre Public» Exception and Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions”, The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1980, p. 259; Carter, P.B.: “The Role of Public Policy in English Private 
International Law”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1993, p. 6; mansoor, Z.: “Contracts 
Contrary to Public Policy under English and Dutch Law”, European Journal of Comparative Law and 
Governance, 2014, p. 300 ff.; Perrone, R.: “Buon costume” e valori costituzionali condivisi. Una prospettiva della 
dignità umana, Napoli, 2015, p. 185 ff.
48 Court of Appeals of New York, Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, [1918] 120 NE 198, 202.
49 Ferrara, F.: Teoria del negozio, cit., p. 4; Carresi, F.: “Il negozio illecito”, cit., p. 33.
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mores in legislative texts mainly lied in the fact that ordre public was not seen, as 
it is today, as a way for recalling general principles, but it usually overlapped with 
specific and rigid mandatory rules of the forum50. This means that public policy was 
seen as a summa of the imperative norms of a domestic system of law.
As we noted in the previous Section, however, the advent of modern 
constitutions determined that, in principle and save for certain exceptions, the only 
admissible ethical evaluations to be made by judges are those which are expressed 
by the values which are crystallized in positive law, especially in constitutions51. 
In the words of a distinguished scholar it is not possible to even imagine that the 
imperativeness of the law and the determination of what is permitted is referred 
to moral evaluations52.
A reference to good morals would, indeed, entail the risk that the evaluation 
of what is decent (and therefore licit) is carried out by adjudicators on a subjective 
basis; and this is exactly the risk that modern legal culture was borne to avoid.
For this reason, one may recall that several scholars talk about Rechtsmoral53 
in order to avoid to let subjective morals come into play in the legal reasoning. 
Similarly, bonnes moeurs should today be deduced from the fundamental principles 
of any legal system54. As a consequence, good morals do not represent an 
autonomous legal category55, and their content started to be merged in the 
concept of ordre public56. It is not by chance, indeed, that the Italian reform of 
private international law carried out in 1995 (by means of Law No. 218)57 and the 
recent French reform of the Code Napoleon (2016)58 have excluded good morals 
from the causes for refusing the application of foreign law and for declaring a 
50 rodotà, S.: “Ordine pubblico o buon costume?”, Giurisprudenza di merito, 1970, p. 105; Crea, C.: “La 
‘resilienza’”, cit., p. 888.
51 rodotà, S.: “Ordine pubblico”, cit., p. 104; PerlinGieri G., “La via alternativa”, cit., pp. 73 ff. 
52 traBuCChi, a.: “Buon costume”, cit., p. 1 (own translation).
53 See Crea, C.: “La ‘resilienza’”, cit., p. 890.
54 These principles (as we saw in Chapter 1) may be directly applied to private law relationships. See CaroCCia, 
F.: Ordine pubblico. La gestione dei conflitti culturali nel diritto privato, Napoli, 2018, p. 163; PerlinGieri, P.: 
“Constitutional Norms and Civil Law Relationships”, The Italian Law Journal, 2015, p. 17 ff.
55 Blom, J.: “Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution Over Time”, Netherlands International 
Law Review, 2003, p. 392: “[t]he growth of constitutionally protected social and economic rights within 
domestic legal systems may enhance considerations of public policy, where private legal issues intersect 
with these constitutional norms”.
56 Crea, C.: “La ‘resilienza’”, cit., p. 890, talks about a “philanthropic” conception of ordre public. This renders 
bonos mores a residual and mainly useless category. See Panza, G.: Buon costume e buona fede, Napoli 
(reprinted in 2013), 1973, p. 142.
57 Articles 16 and 17 of this law only say that foreign law can be refused if it is contrary to public policy and 
overriding mandatory rules respectively. 
58 Ordonnance n. 131 of 10th February 2016. Newly enacted Article 1102, para. 2, of the new French Code Civil 
only says that party autonomy cannot derogate to public policy. 
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contract null and void respectively59. The same happened when the Code Civil of 
Quebec has been reformed60.
With the possible exceptions of sexual morality61 and some indecent religious 
practices (such as, e.g., certain voodoo rituals)62, where ethical evaluations are 
still commonplace,63 good morals now shall be located within the framework of 
positive law64 and, except for common law countries, some post-communist states 
and Germany65, the category of good morals has been completely eroded66. As 
of today, when judges evaluate the compatibility of private actions with bonnes 
moeurs, they are often actually carrying out a legal analysis that could be equally 
made under the umbrella of public policy. A significant example of this practice 
is the English case City of Gotha v. Sotheby’s67. The Federal Republic of Germany, 
which prior to the Second World War owned a seventeenth century Dutch 
painting, sought to recover it, when a Panamanian company tried to sell it through 
auction in London, in 1989. The owner of the painting admitted that he was aware 
of the possibility that the painting had been subject to smuggling, but he claimed 
that Germany’s action was time barred under German law. While refusing to 
apply the time bar, the Court stated that the defense was precluded, because who 
acquired a stolen property in bad faith cannot take advantage of the limitation 
period against the rightful owner. The Court highlighted the dishonest behavior of 
the defendant and affirmed that this “lent a fundamental moral character to the 
issues that faced the Court”68. Unsurprisingly, the defense was considered against 
public policy. Actually, the adjudicator applied – even if without mentioning it – 
59 Guarneri, A.: “La scomparsa delle bonnes moeurs dal diritto contrattuale francese”, La nuova giurisprudenza 
civile commentata, 2017, p. 404 ff.
60 terlizzi, G.: Dal buon costume alla dignità della persona, Napoli, 2013, p. 103 ff.
61	 In	this	regard,	it	is	sufficient	to	think	about	prostitution	(in	the	legal	systems	where	it	is	forbidden).	While	
in principle a sexual performance could be considered as a form of job to be remunerated, the payment of a 
sum of money for this kind of activity is considered to be contra bonos mores and therefore illegal. See, in this 
sense, Italian Supreme Administrative Court, Decision of 22 October 2008, No. 5178. On this matter see 
Carusi, D.: Contratto illecito e soluti retentio, Napoli, 1995, p. 20 f., saying that sexual performances “belong 
to an area of protection of fundamental rights of individuals that cannot be subject to a market logic” (even 
if, when prostitution is forbidden, it could be replied that jointly with the moral disappointment there is 
always a legal ban which, again, could render the category of bonos mores useless). See also Panza, G.: Buon 
costume, cit., p. 100.
62 PaCillo, V.: Buon costume e libertà religiosa, Milano, 2012, p. 149 ff.; Perrone, R.: Buon costume, cit., p. 285 
ff.;	and,	with	specific	regard	to	Muslim	practices,	manCini, L.: Immigrazione musulmana e cultura giuridica, 
Milano, 1998.
63 Reference to “public morals” also took place in the ECHR context as a legal basis for limiting the enjoyment 
of conventional rights. This understanding of the concept of good morals is not the subject of the present 
book; see Perrone, R.: Buon costume, cit., p. 155 ff.
64 lonardo, L.: Ordine pubblico e illiceità del contratto, Napoli, 1993, p. 268 ff. For a contrary approach see Gazzoni, 
2006, pp. 803 ff. On the primacy of constitutional principles see also salerno, F.: “La costituzionalizzazione 
dell’ordine pubblico internazionale”, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2018.
65 In this Country ordre public is completely encompassed in the gute Sitten.
66 Guarneri, A.: “La scomparsa”, cit., p. 405.
67 City of Gotha and Federal Republic of Germany v. Sotheby’s and Cobert Finance S.A., [1998] QBD (unreported 
but mentioned in Blom, J.: “Public Policy”, cit., p. 390).
68 Blom, J.: “Public Policy”, cit., p. 390.
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the notorious principle “ex iniuria jus non oritur”, according to which nobody can 
take advantage of its illegal conduct. The issue was, therefore, purely legal and the 
moral character that the judge gave to it was actually absorbed in the application 
of the mentioned principle.
In light of the above, we can state that, generally speaking, both domestic 
and international public policy involve an analysis of the possible violation of 
Rechtsmoral and, consequently, the concept of good morals in private international 
law nowadays is superfluous69. Ordre public, being a Generalklausel to be filled in 
with the relevant fundamental principles, is able to fulfill the function of “window 
on the outside world”70, without the necessity to recur to the category of bonnes 
moeurs71, which originally carried out this task.
However, some authors affirm that the concept of good morals is currently 
to be interpreted as a reference to human dignity and, for this reason, they still 
consider bonnes moeurs as a useful legal category72. Hence, a contract violating 
human dignity (e.g. providing for slavery) would be null for violation of good 
morals. It is possible to reply to these authors that human dignity, as encapsulated 
in constitutions (e.g. Article 2 of the Italian Constitution and Article 2 of the 1999 
Bolivarian Constituion of Venezuela, affirming the preeminence of human rights) 
or in international charters on human rights, is today a legal value to be related 
to the human rights protected by the law. For this reason, it is not necessary to 
revive the concept of good morals in relation to the safeguard of human dignity, 
in particular to the extent that human dignity is protected through the prism of 
public policy.
In conclusion, we can affirm that the only source of public policy stays in the 
fundamental principles of the positive legal system. representing the Rechtsmoral.73 
For the sake of this analysis, therefore, we will not refer to the concept of good 
morals henceforth.
69 More generally, for this opinion see Badiali, G.: Ordine pubblico e diritto straniero, Milano, 1963, p. 90 ff.; 
rodotà, s.: “Ordine pubblico”, cit., p. 107; Carusi, d.: Contratto illecito, cit., p. 32 ff.; CaroCCia, F.: Ordine 
pubblico., cit., p. 167.
70 This locution is from Crea, C.: “La «resilienza»”, cit., p. 875.
71 For a contrary opinion see Crea, C.: “La «resilienza»”, cit., p. 892 ff, talking about a “resiliency” of bonos 
mores. 
72 oddi, A.: “La riesumazione dei boni mores”, Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 2000, p. 2247; terlizzi, G.: Dal 
buon costume, cit., p. 99. For a confusion between morality and universally protected human rights see also 
verheul, H.: “Public Policy and Relativity”, Netherlands International Law Review, 1979, p. 112.
73 This was originally envisaged by resCiGno, P.: “In pari causa turpitudinis”, Rivista di diritto civile, 1965, 
passim. See also Patti, F.P.: “In pari causa turpitudinis”, cinquant’anni dopo, in aa.vv.: Liber amicorum Pietro 
Rescigno, Napoli, 2018.
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IV. THE ROLE OF SOFT-LAW IN DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF 
PUBLIC POLICY.
Having clarified that the moral conceptions of individuals do not contribute 
to the content of the public policy Generalklausel, for the sake of completeness, 
it is now necessary to spend some lines on whether and how a widely discussed 
(alleged) source of the law, namely soft law, may contribute to the content of 
public policy and, if so, what is the relationship of soft-law sources with domestic 
fundamental principles. Preliminarily, it must be noted that the definition “soft 
law”, traditionally attributed to Lord McNair, is used to describe instruments with 
extra-legal binding effect. 
In this regard, it has been explained that extralegal norms can serve as 
a compromise between sovereignty and the need to establish rules to govern 
international relations. Such rules represent social norms where the expectation 
of compliance is of lesser significance. If a State violates such soft law norms, 
condemnation will be less swift and severe than when it violates a legal norm.74 
(…) It is not easy to define soft law in a precise sense. It does not represent a legal 
concept with a clearly determinable scope and content. It is more of a catchword, 
symbolizing a specific form of social rules in the penumbra of international law. 
To put it abstractly, soft law as a phenomenon in international relations covers all 
those social rules generated by State[s] or other subjects of international law which 
are not legally binding but which are nevertheless of special legal relevance75.
As it was correctly noted, the expression “soft law” seems to contain an 
oxymoron, because the law cannot, by definition, be “soft” since it is characterized 
by coercibility76. Hence, our discussion should end up here, considering that a 
“soft” kind of law is, again, by definition, unable of generating imperative norms (i.e. 
the hardest source of law). Soft law might produce mere social blame.
However, while some authors deemed soft law as a threat to the rule of 
law77, today it is very common to see soft law norms at the basis of the reasoning 
conducting to judicial decisions, in particular in certain areas of public international 
law where a written source of law is lacking (such as the regulation of evidence and 
conflicts of interests in international arbitrations). Hence, some authors claimed 
that, in such cases, there is a very thin line between soft law and hard law.78 
74 thurer, D.: “Soft Law”, in WolFrum, R. (ed.): Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (online 
edition) 2009, para. 6.
75 thurer, D.: “Soft Law”, cit., para. 9.
76 PalomBino, F.M.: Introduzione al diritto internazionale, Bari, 2019, p. 130.
77 klaBBers, J.: “The undesirability of Soft Law”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 1998, p. 381.
78 kauFmann-kohler,	G.:	 “Soft	 Law	 in	 International	Arbitration:	Codification	 and	Normativity”,	 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement, 2010; PalomBino, F.M.: Introduzione, cit., p. 131. 
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This phenomenon takes place mainly in cases where the soft law source comes 
from a very distinguished author, such as the International Law Commission or 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. As an example, it is possible to 
mention the Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, through which the United Nations 
General Assembly explicitly recognized the human right to water and sanitation 
and acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the 
realization of all human rights. This is certainly a soft law instrument which, however, 
was applied by the investment arbitration Tribunal in Urbaser v. Argentina79 as a 
representation of customary international law80.
Does this mean that soft law instruments are apt to directly generate imperative 
principles at the domestic level? The answer seems to be in the negative, for the 
following reasons which directly attain to the functions of this soft law in relation 
to general international law. 
Indeed, soft law may have three effects in its relationship with general 
international law, i.e. declaratory effect, crystallizing effect and generating effect81. 
The first of these effects concerns the codification in written form of an already 
existent general international law norm. In so far as one of these effects takes 
place, it is evident that there may be an indirect interference between this kind of 
soft law norms and domestic imperativeness, which is influenced by the existing 
norm of customary international law, but whose content may be ascertained 
recurring to the soft law instruments. The discourse is slightly different with regard 
to soft law instruments which help in crystallizing customary international norms 
whose content is still in formation and, therefore, subject to variation: here the 
soft law instrument – which, again, does not directly influence domestic imperative 
norms – may be useful for domestic judges in ascertaining the scope of application 
of general international law norms that have a direct influence over domestic 
fundamental principles. Finally, as to soft law instruments which have a catalytic 
effect for the creation of general international law, it is evident that – once the 
general international law norm eventually comes into existence – its content may 
be easily ascertained referring to the “generating” soft law instrument. In this 
case, as well as in the others, soft law influences domestic fundamental principles 
through the medium of general international law within a circular process which 
79 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award of 8 December 2016, para. 1197.
80 See also riPhaGen, W.: “From Soft Law to Ius Cogens and Back”, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 
1987,	who	demonstrated	that	soft	law	may	also	influence	the	creation	of	international	jus cogens norms.
81 GreCo, D.: “Soft law e diritto internazionale generale”, in Rassegna di diritto pubblico europeo, 2021 (in 
course of publication). We will not deal in this book with the relationship between soft-law and treaties 
since this issue falls outside the scope of the present analysis. For a general analysis of the phenomenon of 
unification	of	domestic	systems	of	law	through	soft	law	see	Šarčević,	P.,	“Unification	and	«Soft	Law»”,	in	
stoFFel, W.a. and volken, P. (ed.): Conflicts and Harmonization: Mèlanges en l’honneur d’Alfred E. von Overbeck 
à l’occasion de son 65ème anniversaire, Fribourg, 1990.
Actualidad Jurídica Iberoamericana Nº 15, agosto 2021, ISSN: 2386-4567, pp. 324-349
[342]
exists between the general international law norm and the soft instruments which 
determine its content and scope of application. 
As an example of this practice, it is possible to mention a well-known decision of 
the Italian Supreme Court82 which applied Article 15 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (concerning the right to citizenship) as the legal basis for denying 
the possibility to consider as stateless certain formerly Italian citizens who went 
to live in Libya prior than the WWII and then lost their Libyan citizenship when 
the United Kingdom of Libya was constituted in 1951. Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration (which, being a resolution of the General assembly, is a soft law 
instrument) was therefore apparently used as a direct source of imperativeness. 
However, scholarship, noted that a correct (and contextualized) reading of the 
decision reveals that the Italian Supreme Court used Article 15 to confirm already 
existing norms (both domestic and international) concerning the prohibition of 
statelessness. 
In the same vein – and more explicitly – the same Italian Supreme Court used 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration (on the right to information)83 and Article 
25 (on the right to housing)84 to corroborate already existing customs directly 
generating rights for individuals. 
In conclusion, as far as this author is concerned, while there are no judicial 
decisions directly applying soft law sources as a reason backing the refusal of either 
recognition of foreign judicial decisions or application of foreign law, it seems 
possible (and likely) that the above reasoning applies also in this context. Judges 
might, therefore, refer to soft law instruments in order to ascertain the content 
of existing general international law norms and confer them imperative value 
on the domestic law level in the form of national fundamental principles. This 
does not mean that soft law norms are per se binding85: they provide, indeed, an 
82 Decision of 1st February 1962, n. 191.
83 See Italian Supreme Court (Plenary Session), decision of 17th July 2015 n. 31022.
84 Italian Supreme Court, decision of 1st July 2015, n. 27809.
85 We have therefore to deny the theses which, referring to soft forms of regulation of legal relationships, 
affirm	that	“a	new	legal	order	is	emerging:	 it	comes	from	below,	where	social	systems	and	sub-systems	
demand autonomy and self-regulation. They refuse the control of national governments and develop forms 
of auto-constitutionalism, becoming ‘the realistic candidate (…) to represent the dynamism of civil society’. 
(…) Globalization, with its economic, cultural, social and political transformations, has determined a new 
legal	 order	 that	 is	 based	 on	 a	 legal	 pluralism,	where	 official	 and	 formal	 forms	 of	 law	 are	 shaped	with	
unofficial	and	informal	legal	sources”.	sCamardella, F.: “Law, globalisation, governance: emerging alternative 
techniques”, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 2014, p. 2 (citing teuBner, G.: La cultura del diritto 
nell’epoca della globalizzazione, Roma, 2005, p. 73). According to Scamardella, p. 2, “new legal pluralism is 
the main expression of a new global governance, which is trying to replace the government model based on 
the	national	state	authority”.	This	idea	is,	in	our	opinion,	misplaced	and	does	not	find	any	confirmation	in	
international practice, considering that judges – both national and international, use soft law instruments 
cautiously and are always careful in grounding their decision on existing, formal and binding sources of 
law. In this regard, it is to be noted that the alleged “new legal system” based on soft forms of regulation 
does	not	have	any	positive	foundation	and,	moreover,	it	is	even	difficult	to	identify	its	actors.	For	a	general	
criticism	to	the	concept	of	soft	law	(sometimes	exaggerated,	as	confirmed	by	the	subsequent	writings	of	
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useful tool in order to identify general international law norms which have their 
autonomous binding force and which are apt to influence domestic conceptions 
of imperativeness86.
From the above, and in conclusion, we can infer that while judges are precluded 
from applying their conception of what is moral in the concrete utilization of 
the public policy Generalklausel, other non-legal standards – known as soft-law 
sources – may, by way of interpretation, actively contribute to the delineation of 
the content of ordre public. The determination of the content of public policy for 
the purpose of Regulations 1103 and 1104 of 2016 will be a complex interpretative 
task which, in any case, will circularly involve the circumstances of concrete cases 
and the relevant fundamental principles, but will only be indirectly affected by 
considerations which are not linked to the relevant legal system.
the same author) see also d’asPremont, J.: “Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New 
Legal Materials”, The European Journal of International Law, 2008.
86 Another, but related, discourse concerns the capability of soft-law norms to “codify” general principles of 
private international law and, more generally, the effects of soft law over private international law. In this 
regard see leandro,	A.:	“La	codificazione	del	diritto	internazionale	privato	fra	strumenti	internazionalistici	e	
diritto dell’Unione europea”, in annoni, a., Forlati, s., and salerno F. (ed.): La codificazione nell’ordinamento 
internazionale e dell’Unione europea, Naples, 2019, p 283 ff. The author argues that soft law instruments 
may	constitute	a	significant	impulse	for	the	codification	of	private	international	law	within	domestic	legal	
systems, they may systematize the emergence of trends in state practice or, in any case, they may represent 
the state of art of private international law on a certain subject (even on the basis of a comparative 
approach). As an example of this practice, it is possible to mention the Model Laws enacted by UNCITRAL 
with regard to private international law regulation of subjects such as cross-border insolvency. The author 
highlights that soft law instruments related to private international law have been used also within the 
context of the European Union. The reference applies, e.g., to the Commission’s communication COM 
(2018) 89 of 12th March 2018, on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. 
This communication was aimed at promoting clarity and predictability about which country’s law applies 
to determine who owns the underlying assets of the transaction is of the essence. In this regard, the 
Commission noted that in presence of various directives regulating the subject (98/26/CE of 19th May 
1998, 2002/47/CE of 6th June 2002, 2001/24/CE of 4th April 2001) as well as of the Hague Convention of 
5th July 2006 on the law applicable to certain rights in respect of securities held with an intermediary 
(which	was	neither	ratified	by	the	EU	nor	for	the	Member	States),	it	was	worth	issuing	a	communication	
clarifying the Commission’s views on important aspects of the existing EU acquis with regard to the law 
applicable to proprietary effects of transactions in securities (in order to avoid, as far as possible, the 
interpretative uncertainties generated by this bundle of legal instruments). In this regard, it is likely that the 
Communication will be a point of reference for adjudicators dealing with the subject. 
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